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TITLE IX: PROBLEMS WITH LITIGATION ANALYSIS
Bibek Das
INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, [EN 1] a great
deal of controversy and legal woes has arisen as a result of the amendment. Title IX was created
to allow for growth in culture, skills, and ideals for both genders provided by equal opportunities
in intercollegiate athletics. In addition, Title IX was also created to prevent further gender-related
discrimination while providing equal opportunity for both genders in intercollegiate athletics.
Although great strides have been made in creating equality in college athletics, in recent years
questions have been raised as to the vitality of Title IX in creating opportunities while
eradicating sexual discrimination. Issues have been raised as to the method the courts use in
determining Title IX violations, as well as, whether Title IX is promoting a positive future for
equality while maintaining athletic integrity. There have also been issues raised as to whether
there can ever be a valid Title IX analysis that can co-exist with Men's Intercollegiate Football.
However, recently, the effectiveness of Title IX, when compared to the positive effects it
had on women's sports during the 1970's, seems to have tailed off. Instead, today many will
argue that Title IX only acts as a stopgap for further gender discrimination and fails to create the
ideal equal opportunity.
This article will concentrate on recent Title IX litigation and the methods the court uses
in evaluating a Title IX violation. Part II will focus on the history of Title IX through its creation
and implementation. Part III will look at the method the current courts have been using in
evaluating a Title IX violation by intercollegiate athletic programs. Part IV will take a closer
look at recent benchmark cases under Title IX violations. Part V will concentrate on problems in
current Title IX violation analysis. Part VI will center on remedies available to correct the
problems in Title IX analysis.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Creation of Title IX
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to prohibit sex
discrimination in any educational program or activity that receives Federal funds. [EN 2] The
underlying principle behind Title IX was that educational institutions should not use Federal
funds to subsidize discrimination based on gender. [EN 3] The statute of Title IX clearly
delineates that "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance..."[EN 4] However, the statute itself
neither clarified how Title IX would apply to intercollegiate athletics, nor did it specify the
methods courts could use to evaluate, analyze, and determine Title IX violations.
In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") [EN 5] published
final regulations in applying the statute of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics. The first section of
the regulations dealt with institutional awards for athletic scholarships. [EN 6] The published
regulations provided that there needed to be reasonable opportunities for athletic scholarships for

24

members of both genders in proportion to the number of students of each gender participating in
intercollegiate sports. [EN 7] In addition, a second section of the published regulations also dealt
with "equal opportunity" provided for members of both sexes in intercollegiate athletics. [EN 8]
However, these regulations were still unclear as to the application and methods of analysis for
proper compliance of Title IX in litigation and the use of Title IX by the Courts.
Finally, in 1978, after issues and questions arose as to the application of Title IX to
intercollegiate athletics, the HEW provided further guidelines as to what constituted proper
compliance with the law under the Title IX Policy Interpretation. The purpose of the Policy
Interpretation was to clarify the meaning of Equal Opportunity in college athletics. It contains
the requirements prescribed by the Policy Interpretation of Title IX that are currently being used
by the courts to evaluate and analyze an institution's compliance with Title IX under recent Title
IX litigation.
B. Program-Specificv. Institution-Wide
Despite the HEW guidelines, the courts, educational institutions, and legislatures still had
a major issue to clarify about Title IX. This issue was whether Title IX had a broad institutionwide application or whether Title IX only applied to specific institutional programs. The courts
had to determine whether Title IX only applied to specific programs receiving Federal funds
("program-specific"), or if it applied to all of the departments within an institution receiving
some form of federal funds ("institution-wide"). [EN 9] The Policy Interpretation did not help
resolve the disagreement among courts as to the scope of the statute. [EN 10] Until 1988, the
judiciary remained divided on the issue of whether a "recipient" [EN 11] of funds meant a
specific program or if it applied to the entire institution. [EN 12]
The courts in Grove City College v. Bell seriously tackled the issue of program-specific
versus institution-wide application of Title IX. [EN 13] Grove City College was a private coeducational college that did not receive any direct Federal financial assistance except in the form
of Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's) that were given to enrolled students. [EN 14]
The Court found that the Federal grants for the enrolled students brought Grove City College
under the definition of "recipient" [EN 15] of Federal assistance. [EN 16] The Court held that the
only program that received the Federal assistance was the Financial Aid Program and thus
implemented a "program-specific" interpretation of Title IX. [EN 17] Therefore, no gender
discrimination would be tolerated solely under the financial aid program at the college.
The Court's holding in Grove City College "effectively removed nearly every university
athletic program from the purview of Title IX". [EN 18] As a result of this holding the Director
of the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education ("OCR") [EN 19] was unable to
fully investigate claims of alleged discrimination in intercollegiate athletics. [EN 20] In 1988,
Congress remedied the problems created by the Grove City College holding by implementing the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. [EN 21] Under this Act, Congress broadened the scope of
Title IX, thus making it an institution-wide application of Title IX. [EN 22] The implementation
of this Act opened the doors for complaints against universities for Title IX violations in their
athletic programs. As a result, "the Act provided new support for Title IX litigation." [EN 23]
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III. METHOD OF EVALUATION OF TITLE IX LITIGATION

Since the passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, [EN 24] there was
little litigation in an attempt to create equal opportunities for women in intercollegiate athletics
until the passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. However, in recent years there
have been judicial decisions on women's athletics marked by three significant cases. These three
cases are Cohen v. Brown, [EN 25] Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., [EN 26] and Favia v.
Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania. [EN 27] All three of these cases involved gender discrimination
through the elimination of women's varsity intercollegiate athletic programs. In each of these
cases, the courts further determined a method of analysis for gender discrimination through the
requirements established in the Policy Interpretation of Title IX. [EN 28] The three benchmarks,
also known as the three-part test, for evaluation of gender discrimination under the Policy
Interpretation under Title IX, as applied by the courts in Title IX litigation, are:
1. Whether intercollegiate (or interscholastic) level of participation opportunities
for male and female students is provided in numbers substantially proportionate
to their respective enrollments;
2. Where the members of ones sex have been underrepresented among
intercollegiate (or interscholastic) athletes, whether the institution can show a
history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably
responsive to the developing interests and abilities of that sex;
3. Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate (or
interscholastic) athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of
program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that
the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program. [EN 29]
These three benchmarks, (1) proportionality, (2) expansion, and (3) accommodation, of the
Policy Interpretation are currently the main focus of Title IX litigation. As we will see, most of
the courts dealing with Title IX litigation have become dependant on the three-part test of the
Policy Interpretation.
IV. BENCHMARK CASES IN TITLE IX LITIGATION

A. Cohen v. Brown [EN 30]
In May 1991, in an attempt to lower its budget, Brown University's athletic department
demoted four varsity teams to club status. [EN 31] The University trimmed their budget, because
there was less funding needed for club sports. [EN 32] These teams included women's volleyball,
women's gymnastics, men's water polo, and men's golf. [EN 33] This action by the University
directly affected the percentage of women that were involved in intercollegiate varsity sports.
During the 1991-92 season, the percentage of women involved in varsity sports was 36.6% as
opposed to the percentage of women enrolled in the undergraduate, which was 48.2%. [EN 34]
In 1992, the members of both the women's volleyball and gymnastics filed a class action against
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Brown to get a preliminary injunction forcing Brown to reinstate the two women's teams to
varsity status. [EN 35] In addition, the members of the teams sought to prevent any further
elimination of varsity women's intercollegiate athletic teams unless the percentage of women's
athletic participation was equal to the percentage of women enrolled in the Brown
undergraduate. [EN 36]
The District Court found for the plaintiffs and granted the preliminary injunction. [EN
37] The District Court found that Brown violated Title IX regulations by failing to comply with
the effective accommodation provision of the equal opportunity regulation. [EN 38] The District
Court reasoned that the Title IX violation could be evaluated by the three-part test under the
Policy Interpretation of Title IX. [EN 39]
In the application of the three-part test, the court found that Brown had violated the first
prong of the test, the "substantially proportionate" test. [EN 40] The court found the near 13%
difference in women enrolled in the undergraduate (48.2%) versus the amount of female
intercollegiate varsity athletes (36.6%) was substantially disproportionate. [EN 41] In addition,
the court applied the second prong of the test, which was the "continuing practice" to expand the
women's varsity program element. [EN 42] The court found that, although Brown had a history
of substantial growth in the 1970's, the University failed to meet the increased rate of
undergraduate women by simultaneously increasing the amount and quality of women's varsity
athletics. [EN 43] Therefore, Brown had failed the second prong of the three-part test because of
a lack of increased expansion and quality for women's sports. Finally, the court considered the
third prong of the three-part test as to whether Brown "fully and effectively accommodated" the
interests and abilities of their female athletes. [EN 44] The court found that Brown failed to
meet this standard because they did not effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of
women, because they demoted the women's programs from the more competitive varsity status.
[EN 45]
The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's holding. [EN 46] However, they found
that the language of Title IX does not find a Title IX violation solely based on numerical
inequality in percentages of women. [EN 47] Therefore, the court held that all three prongs of
the three-part test must be met in order to find a violation of Title IX. [EN 48] The Court of
Appeals found that the District Court, in its analysis, properly ruled that Brown violated all three
prongs. [EN 49]
B. Roberts v. Colorado State University [EN 50]
In 1991, Colorado State University ("CSU"), in an attempt to meet budget restrictions,
eliminated its fifty-five member men's varsity baseball team and eighteen member women's
varsity softball team. [EN 51] The year following the elimination of these varsity teams, the
percentage of women participating in varsity sports was 37.7% while the enrollment of women
in the University was 48.2%. [EN 52] The members of the eliminated softball team filed a suit
claiming that CSU violated Title IX by denying them equal opportunity to participate in
athletics, and sought an injunction to reinstate the women's softball team. [EN 53]
The District Court used the three-part test analysis as laid out by the Policy Interpretation
of Title IX in order to determine whether CSU violated Title IX by eliminating the women's
varsity softball team. [EN 54] The court found that under the first prong of the three-part test,
disparity between participating female athletes and female undergraduate enrollment, CSU did
violate the requirement under the Title IX Policy Interpretation. [EN 55] The court found that

27

the 10.6% disparity between the amount of women participating in athletics and the amount of
women enrolled in the undergraduate was substantially disproportionate. [EN 56]
The court then applied the second prong of the test, whether there was a history of
continuing practice of expansion of athletic programs to accommodate the discriminated gender.
[EN 57] The court found that CSU had not added any new teams to its varsity program in twelve
years. [EN 58] In fact, the court found that the amount of women participating in varsity
intercollegiate athletics at CSU had declined in those twelve years. [EN 59] In addition, the
court was influenced by the fact that CSU had pledged voluntarily to increase the amount of
women participating in varsity athletics when the OCR was investigating it in 1983. [EN 60]
During the OCR monitoring, CSU did increase the amount of women participating in varsity
athletics. However, once the OCR stopped monitoring CSU in 1989, the amount of women
participation dropped back to the 1983 rate. [EN 61] The court took this into consideration and
found that CSU did not demonstrate a history and continuing practice of program expansion.
[EN 62]
Finally, the court applied the third prong of the test, which was whether an institutional
athletic program demonstrates that the interests and abilities of the members of the discriminated
gender have been fully and effectively accommodated. [EN 63] The court found that CSU failed
this prong of the three-part test on two grounds: the first being that CSU completely eliminated a
varsity softball program and a participation opportunity for females even though there was an
overwhelming interest in the varsity softball athletic program. [EN 64] The court also found that
CSU failed this prong, because there were five women's club athletic programs that had
expressed interest in becoming an intercollegiate varsity team. [EN 65]
This court reaffirmed the sentiments of the Cohen court in holding that "a financial crisis
could not justify gender discrimination." [EN 66] The court upheld the plaintiffs claim for a
permanent injunction to reinstate the varsity softball team at CSU. [EN 67]
C. Favia v. Indiana University ofPennsylvania[EN 68]
During the 1990-91 school year, Indiana University of Pennsylvania ("IUP") had 55.6%
of its undergraduate student body represented by women. [EN 69] During this same year, the
amount of women enrolled in varsity athletics was 37.7%. [EN 70] Only 21% of the athletic

scholarships awarded during this school year were distributed to women. [EN 71] In August
1991, in order to meet budget restrictions, IUP had its athletic department eliminate the women's
gymnastics and field hockey teams as well as eliminating the men's soccer and tennis teams. [EN
72] After the elimination of these athletic programs, the amount of participating women varsity
athletes was reduced to 37.5% of all varsity athletes. [EN 73]

In October 1992, the members of the eliminated women's varsity athletic teams filed a
class action suit against IUP seeking a preliminary injunction to reinstate the eliminated women's
varsity teams and to prevent IUP from further eliminating any women's varsity athletic
programs. [EN 74] The District Court, similar to the Cohen [EN 75] and Roberts [EN 76] courts,
used the three-part test of the Policy Interpretation to analyze whether IUP violated the Title IX
requirements. [EN 77]
The court first determined whether the first prong of the test, the substantial
proportionality between the amount of women enrolled in the undergraduate and the percentage
of women participating in varsity athletics, was violated. [EN 78] The court found that the
disparity in the percentages of women enrolled in the undergraduate (55.6%) and the percentage

28

of women in varsity intercollegiate athletics (37.5%) was substantially disproportionate. [EN 79]

The court declared that the elimination of the two women's teams only "exacerbated an already
existing Title IX violation." [EN 80]
The court then applied the second prong of the three-part test as to whether there was a
history of continuing expansion in athletic opportunities for the discriminated gender. [EN 81]
The court found that IUP failed this prong of the test, because they were unable to show a
continuing practice of expanding athletic opportunities to respond to the developing interests of
its women students. [EN 82]
Finally, the court applied the third prong of the three-part test, whether the institution
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of the discriminated gender had been
fully and effectively accommodated. [EN 83] Similar to the holdings of Cohen [EN 84] and
Roberts, [EN 85] this court found that ISU eliminated the varsity athletic participation
opportunity even though there was evidence of interest and ability in the women's programs. [EN
86]
V. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT TITLE IX METHODS OF ANALYSIS

The judicial analysis for Title IX litigation, currently used by the courts based upon the
three-part test of the Policy Interpretation, has caused "a myriad of problems" for athletes of both
sexes and the institutions themselves. [EN 87] In this day of budget restrictions, the courts leave
little room for athletic programs to meet many of these budget restrictions mandated by the
educational institutions.
A. Numerical v. Non-DiscriminatoryAnalysis
Using the Policy Interpretation of Title IX as a guide, it is clear from the three-benchmark
cases Cohen, [EN 88] Roberts [EN 89], and Favia, [EN 90] that the courts have adopted a more
numerical approach to determine Title IX violations by an institution. The courts, in all three of
these cases, looked at the parity in numbers based on percentages of female athletes in varsity
sports and the percentages of females enrolled in the respective undergraduate. However, what
the courts tended to overlook in these cases was the overall discriminatory effects of the
elimination of varsity athletic programs on the individual athletes.
In all three of these cases, the Title IX violation was triggered by the elimination of a
female varsity athletic program. The courts analyzed each case by focusing mainly on one
aspect, the numerical parity between male and female athletes in the athletic programs of each
respective institution. Although there has been great progress in women participation in varsity
athletics, the judiciary fails to focus on what should be at the heart of analysis of a Title IX
violation: whether there is true discrimination in the treatment of an individual student, based on
gender, who wishes to participate in athletic competition. [EN 91] The courts have "ignored the
issues relating to discrimination and have focused almost exclusively on raw numbers." [EN 92]
Based on Title IX analysis, the courts can use two methods of evaluation. One being
numerical parity analysis, which focuses on raw numbers and determines whether each gender is
proportionately represented in each educational program, [EN 93] and the other being nondiscriminatory analysis, which focuses on the fact that the treatment of the individual cannot be
different simply because of gender. [EN 94] Under the numerical parity analysis, the court
focuses less on the individuality of a student, and concerns itself with whether the student is a
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member of a particular gender and athletic program. In essence, the court's only concern, as
evidenced by their analysis of Cohen, Roberts, and Favia, is the meeting of numerical goals and
quotas. [EN 95] For example, in Roberts, CSU eliminated both men's baseball and women's
softball to meet budget constraints. [EN 96] This elimination was not directed towards women
specifically. However, the court still found this to constitute gender discrimination in violation
of Title IX. As a result of the disparity in numbers, the court required CSU to reinstate the
women's varsity softball program and did not allow CSU to remedy the problem in any other
manner, such as limiting male varsity enrollment, cutting a male sport, or even adding another
women's sport. [EN 97] However, if the court used a non-discriminatory method of analysis, it
would have focused on whether the elimination of women's softball had an unfair or
discriminatory treatment to the individual members of the team, rather than the participation
rates of women in the athletic program generally. [EN 98] Similarly, in the decisions in Cohen
[EN 99] and Favia, [EN 100] the court also focused their analysis of Title IX violations
specifically on the numerical parity in participants in intercollegiate athletics. [EN 101]
Although the courts based their decisions on numerical analysis in Cohen, Roberts and
Favia, in Cook v. Colgate, [EN 102] the courts took a more non-discriminatory approach in their
analysis of a Title IX violation. In 1990, the former members of the women's club ice hockey
team brought a complaint against Colgate University for violating Title IX. [EN 103] The
complaint was based on the University's denial of the request made by the women to elevate the
club hockey team into varsity status. [EN 104] The women's ice hockey applications were denied
on all four attempts to attain varsity status. [EN 105] As a result of the final rejection by the
University in 1988, the former members decided to bring a Title IX violation complaint against
Colgate. [EN 106]
In its analysis, the court in Colgate used a more non-discrimination approach. The court
looked at how the female hockey players were treated in comparison to the male hockey players.
The court analyzed several aspects of the difference in the method the ice hockey teams were run
by the University. These aspects that came under the scrutiny of the court were (1) the financial
support, (2) the equipment, (3) the locker room facilities, (4) the travel, (5) the practice times,
and (6) the coaching of the two teams. [EN 107] The court found that (1) the men's hockey team
received 50 times the financial support of the women's teams, [EN 108] (2) the men were
provided their own equipment while the women were forced to purchase their own equipment,
[EN 109] (3) the men's locker room was 2,500 square feet, while the women's was only 225
square feet, [EN 110] (4) the men's team traveled in chartered buses, while the women drove
themselves to their games, [EN 111] (5) the men's team had access to the best times for practice
and had the ability to bump the women out of their practice time slots; [EN 112] and (6) the
coaches for the men's team were highly paid while the coaches for the women's team were only
given a minimal stipend because they were volunteers. [EN 113] In analyzing the discriminatory
method that Colgate ran the men and women's ice hockey program, the court found Colgate to be
in violation of Title IX. Interestingly, though, the court in Colgate never mentioned the three-part
test of the Policy Interpretation that was used by the courts in determining Title IX violations in
Cohen, Roberts, and Favia. This court looked strictly at the treatment of the individual women,
rather than looking at the raw numbers of the University's athletic program on the whole.
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B. Inclusion of College Football in Title LAnalysis
The courts have laid the groundwork for Title IX litigation by determining that a proper
analysis requires the use of the three-part test of the Policy Interpretation. However, it has been
shown through the three landmark cases that meeting the criteria of the three-part test can be
nearly impossible for many institutions. The problem for institutions to meet the requirements set
forth in the three-part test stems from the inclusion of men's intercollegiate football teams into a
Title IX analysis. "Almost no university that offers a full array of sports for both men and
women, including a men's football team, can fulfill the substantial proportionality test of the first
benchmark because the size of the football teams yields disproportional percentages in the
athletic program." [EN 114] A men's football team, on average, includes 120 male athletes and
requires nearly four million dollars in expenses by the institution. [EN 115] In a typical Division
I-A school, the cost to run a football program nearly doubles the amount of money needed to run
the entire female varsity athletic program. [EN 116] In addition, no women's sport requires as
many individuals to participate, as does a men's football program. [EN 117] Thus, it is nearly
impossible for an institution to meet the substantial proportionality requirement of the Policy
Interpretation. Therefore, all universities with an intercollegiate football team will be found in
violation of Title IX.
A consequence of including men's football into Title IX analysis is the elimination of
smaller and lower revenue athletic programs. [EN 118] An institution, in an effort to prevent
Title IX litigation will eliminate smaller male athletic programs, such as golf, wrestling, or
tennis. [EN 119] An institution will avoid eliminating a women's athletic program as to avoid
any further Title IX litigation, which has proven to be successful as evidenced by Cohen, Roberts
and Favia. Another reason an institution will avoid eliminating a football team is the revenues
the program brings to the university. [EN 120] In addition to providing the school with a more
marketable name and a history that breeds funding from many sources, the revenue of college
football helps maintain a strong funding base for the other athletic programs. [EN 121]
Supporters of large football programs argue that the popularity of college football enables a
university to do more for women's sports. [EN 122]
Thus, for these reasons, most Division I-A institutions will avoid eliminating a football
program and will always have an athletic program that has a substantially disproportional
number of women participating in varsity athletics as opposed to men. This large disparity in
numbers, due to college football, causes a flawed analysis of athletic programs under Title IX.
The courts and OCR must find a way to correct the numerical disparity caused by college
football before more gender discrimination against individual athletes is caused by the disparity.
VI. REMEDIES TO TITLE IX ANALYSIS PROBLEMS

A. Options to Remedy Problems Created by CurrentAnalysis Methods
The first option of correcting the problems created by a numerical analysis approach is
for the legislature to determine. The courts should have little to do with determining the method
of analysis, but rather should be focused on implementing the method. [EN 123] Therefore, the
legislature should place a focus on amending the current Title IX and maintaining an analysis
focused more on discrimination than on meeting a numerical goal or quota. [EN 124]
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Another method to avoid gender discrimination is to focus on all students as a whole.
This would include individuals that are not involved in intercollegiate athletics in an analysis to
determine sexual discrimination. Currently, Title IX focuses on varsity athletes and does not pay
much attention to club and intramural sports, which are under the regulations of Title IX. [EN
125] Title IX should be centered towards all athletes, whether they have superior athletic ability
or not. Title IX was meant as a method of preventing discrimination towards an individual based
on gender, not on athletic ability.
The other problem with the numerical parity approach of Title IX analysis is that it fails
to include programs other than the traditional varsity sports. Title IX does not label cheerleading,
aerobics, and dancing as sports or activities that require the same athletic ability as a sport like
football or volleyball. However, many programs like cheerleading require great skill that is
similar to many varsity sports. If cheerleading were included under Title IX, then the numerical
disparity in the percentage of women involved in sports would definitely be reduced and the
strain on an institution to meet Title IX requirements would be greatly reduced. In addition, the
interests and abilities of individuals of both genders would be met. Again, the main focus of Title
IX should be the discriminatory effect of a sport on one gender as compared to another, rather
than a numerical disparity.
Another possible solution to the numerical disparity approach is to create a cap on
expenditures by certain intercollegiate athletic programs. Therefore, all institutions would be
required to fall under a certain cap of expenditures, like scholarships, that they would be allowed
to allot to their entire athletic programs, as well as each individual varsity sport. The cap would
force schools to spend similarly on sports of different genders, rather than a school making
greater expenditures on a high revenue sport, like college football.
B. Options to Remedy Problems Between College Football and Title IXAnalysis
One option raised by members of Congress and critics of Title IX is the total exclusion of
football from a Title IX analysis. [EN 126] This approach would allow a university to meet the
substantial proportionality requirement of the three-part test with very few implications on entire
athletic programs. By eliminating college football, which has great history and revenue
implications, from Title IX analysis, an institution would likely have very little disparity in the
percentage of female athletes as compared to the percentage of women enrolled in the
undergraduate. Many supporters feel that football should be excluded because of its ability to
bring in revenue that could be redistributed to other athletic programs, mainly women's varsity
athletic programs. One court did attempt to remove football from Title IX analysis, which was in
Blair v. Washington State University. [EN 127] However, the Appellate Court found that the
exclusion of football would only perpetuate discrimination that Title IX was created to prevent.
[EN 128] The fallacy of the removal of football approach is that the exclusion would perpetuate
gender inequality in athletic participation, because courts would not be comparing all of the
women's intercollegiate varsity programs with the men's intercollegiate varsity programs. [EN
129]
Some of the other solutions to the numerical disparity caused by football include
reducing the team sizes, available scholarships, and size of coaching staff. Currently, most
Division I-A football teams have over a hundred male members. In comparison, professional
football teams have only forty-seven members on the team. [EN 130] Cutting the team rosters in
half would decrease the numerical disparity, thus making it more feasible for an institution with a
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football team to meet the substantially proportional requirement of the three-part test. In
addition, the NCAA allows football teams to allocate eighty-five scholarships to its member
athletes. [EN 131] As mentioned above, a cap provided in the regulations of Title IX would
remedy this issue, thus correcting the disparity issue. Finally, football coaching staffs currently
include twelve coaches for their programs. [EN 132] The numerical disparity in funding towards
varsity athletics could be corrected if the amount of coaches were reduced in half so that the
expenditures would be less for male athletic programs.
Most institutions are wary of changing the status quo now maintained by the sport of
intercollegiate football. Unfortunately, as a result, many of these options will likely not be
changed as to prevent a decline in competitiveness and overall interest in the high revenue sport
of college football.
VII. CONCLUSION

Although Title IX has clearly achieved much success in creating equality amongst
student athletes of both genders, it has clearly not come without its problems. The progress
institutions have made in trying to create equal varsity athletic programs since the early 1970's
has tailed off in recent years. Much of this can be attributed to the differences in levels of
interests in athletics between the two genders. The courts, the legislatures, and the institutions
must realize that total equality amongst the genders may never be possible. Therefore, they
should act accordingly and maintain the current status quo and tailor Title IX as a tool that
prevents further gender discrimination rather than one that sacrifices the positives of
intercollegiate athletics present today.
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